An unfinished experiment: ambiguity and conflict in the implementation of higher skills policy by Hordern, J
  
Hordern, J. (2015) ‘An unfinished experiment: ambiguity 
and conflict in the implementation of higher skills policy’. 
Research Papers in Education, 30 (2): 248-265. 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article first published by Taylor & Francis Group in Research 
Papers in Education on 17/01/2014, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02671522.2013.879335#.VPhtfCz7Oix 
 
ResearchSPAce 
http://researchspace.bathspa.ac.uk/ 
 
This version is made available in accordance with publisher policies.  
Please cite only the published version using the reference above. 
 
Your access and use of this document is based on your acceptance of the 
ResearchSPAce Metadata and Data Policies, as well as applicable law:-
https://researchspace.bathspa.ac.uk/policies.html  
Unless you accept the terms of these Policies in full, you do not have 
permission to download this document. 
This cover sheet may not be removed from the document. 
 
Please scroll down to view the document. 
1 
 
An unfinished experiment: ambiguity and conflict in the implementation of higher skills 
policy  
 
 
Jim Hordern 
School of Education 
Bath Spa University 
Bath, BA2 9BN 
j.hordern@bathspa.ac.uk  
 
AUTHORS VERSION  
Citation: Hordern, J. 2015. An unfinished experiment: ambiguity and conflict in the 
implementation of higher skills policy. Research Papers in Education 30 (2), 248-265. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
An unfinished experiment: ambiguity and conflict in the implementation of higher skills 
policy  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The higher skills policy of the U.K New Labour government emerged from the 
recommendations of the Leitch Review of Skills, and was implemented in England between 
2007 and 2010.   The policy aimed to encourage higher education institutions to engage with 
employers and employer representative bodies to design and deliver higher education 
provision that reflected the needs of employers. Using key policy documents and evidence 
submitted to a select committee inquiry, aspects of ambiguity and conflict in the 
implementation of this policy are explored.  This focuses on three specific areas where 
disagreements amongst parties, or with government, were observed, and ambiguities of 
policy means and objectives. Although conflict amongst interested parties is evident, this was 
not extensive within the higher education sector as the policy was not seen as relevant to all 
institutions. The demonstrable ambiguity enables the policy to be absorbed and made 
appropriate to the norms and culture of the higher education sector. The experimental 
structure of the policy, while always ambiguous, lost its rationale with the change of U.K. 
government in 2010.  
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Introduction 
The assumed relationship between improved skills supply and economic growth still 
pervades skills policy in England (DBIS 2010, 4-5; Payne and Keep 2011). Prominent 
politicians, businesses and union leaders have argued that more ‘higher level skills’ are 
needed in order to drive the economy (Leitch 2006, 62; Brown, Green, and Lauder 2001), and 
that reform should concentrate on the supply of skills. These arguments have predominated 
despite evidence which exposes the problematics of focusing primarily on education and 
training reform without a more concerted approach to improving skills demand and utilisation 
in the workplace (Keep, Mayhew, and Payne 2006; Payne 2008a;  Lloyd and Payne 2006). 
Although a recognition of the importance of employer demand for skills has gradually 
emerged at a United Kingdom level (UKCES 2010a, 8-9) and was also reflected in greater 
industrial activism towards the end of the New Labour government (Keep 2011; DBERR 
2009), the policy interventions necessary to deliver more radical change are hindered in 
England by the absence of social partnership structures that could underpin skills formation, 
and the political difficulties of advancing greater regulation (Lloyd and Payne 2006).  
Arguments ‘for skills’ were made during the New Labour era in the Leitch Review and the 
subsequent implementation plan (Leitch 2006; DIUS 2007), and in publications that aimed to 
engender partnership between employer and higher education institutions (i.e. CBI 2008). 
Critical voices have been marginal in public debate in England. There have been suggestions 
that ‘skills’ policy solutions cannot make progress without changes in workplace practice and 
industrial strategies (Payne and Keep 2011; Coffield 2000), and without profound change in 
political and economic systems (Rikowski 2004; Ainley 1993). The emphasis on skills supply 
can be seen as an expression of the ‘state theory of learning’ (Lauder et al. 2011) and the 
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‘education gospel’ (Grubb and Lazerson 2005), which portray education as the silver bullet 
that will deliver national competitiveness and prosperity for all within a knowledge economy.  
In 2008 the New Labour government published Higher Education at Work: High Skills High 
Value which set out a framework for the implementation of policy that would bring together 
higher education institutions, government agencies, employer representative bodies and 
employers to deliver the higher skills objectives of World Class Skills: Implementing the 
Leitch Review of Skills in England (DIUS 2007). In World Class Skills, the government had 
accepted the Leitch recommendation that by 2020 ‘more than 40% of all adults’ should have 
higher education qualifications (DIUS 2007, 9), and outlined expectations that the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)  would ‘substantially expand’ support for 
employer engagement at higher education institutions (2007, 12). The Leitch Review had 
recommended that the ‘priorities of higher education institutions’ be ‘rebalanced’ to ‘make 
available relevant, flexible and responsive provision’ with some funding for higher education 
becoming ‘demand-led’ to meet employer needs (Leitch 2006, 21, 68). However, the 
government implementation plan was more equivocal, with a commitment to ‘encourage HE 
institutions to collaborate with employers in delivering training that meets employers’ needs’ 
(DIUS 2007,36) in tandem with ‘stronger interaction between HE institutions and SSC’s 
(Sector Skills Councils)’ (2007, 51), the bodies responsible for representing the skills 
requirements of employers in specific sectors.  Higher Education at Work asserted that it is 
‘people currently in the workforce’ who need ‘to acquire higher-level skills’ (2008, 6), and 
that ‘new ways of working’ are necessary ‘to meet the potential market from employers and 
employees’ (2008, 7) but did not prescribe approaches to engaging employers. 
Simultaneously, the HEFCE introduced capacity building incentives for institutions to engage 
with employers and build workforce development partnerships as part of the Transforming 
Workforce Development Programme (DIUS 2008; Kewin et al. 2011).  
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The insights of implementation studies suggest that relationships between actors have 
considerable impact on policy outputs and outcomes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Barrett 
2004; Matland 1995). In the higher skills policy context, the tensions of higher education 
policy interface with the systemic complexity of the English learning and skills infrastructure 
(Keep 2006; Coffield 2000), creating conditions for ambiguity and conflict. Policy 
implementation required a degree of co-operation between higher education institutions and 
external bodies to develop provision led by employer demand. This can be seen as part of a 
controversial  process of repositioning  higher education to serve the needs of arbiters of 
knowledge validity situated ‘outside’ the academy, reflecting a shift towards ‘mode 2’ 
knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994) and the ongoing re-invention of the relationship between the 
higher education institution, industry and the state (Delanty 2001; Fuller 2003).Whereas the 
higher education policy environment is characterised by powerful ideologies of institutional 
autonomy and entrepreneurialism that can influence policy outcomes (Tapper and Salter 
1995; Barnett 2003), despite the potential for brutal cuts (Taylor 2005), skills policy in the 
U.K. has been characterised by a stream of initiatives and reorganisations that have 
repeatedly failed to meet their stated objectives (Keep et al. 2006; Payne and Keep 2011) .  
This article examines ambiguity and conflict in the implementation of New Labour’s higher 
skills policy, providing an interpretation for its experimental character. Matland’s (1995) 
model of policy implementation is used to identify inherent ambiguities and potential 
conflicts in the policy. This is followed by an examination of written evidence submitted to a 
select committee inquiry, and the identification of three principal areas of contention amongst 
actors engaged in the policy environment. Significant levels of ambiguity can be detected, 
and this may suggest a process of ensuring that the policy is acceptable and legitimate within 
a higher education sector that has developed its own capacity, independent of the initiatives 
of individual institutions, to absorb, resist and rework policy to the mutual advantage of most, 
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if not all, of its members (Watson 2002, 2012). This leads to an explanation as to why an 
experimental approach to implementation was preferred.  
Higher skills policy – potential opportunities for conflict 
Matland (1995), in his outline of the ambiguity-conflict model of implementation, provides a 
discussion of the forms of policy implementation that operate where there is conflict 
surrounding policy objectives or the means by which the policy is implemented.  Drawing on 
Dahrendorf’s (1958) analysis of social conflict, Matland specifies three key factors that need 
to be present for conflict to arise, describing these as ‘an interdependence of actors, an 
incompatibility of objectives, and a perceived zero-sum element to the interactions’ (Matland 
1995, 13). In short, where different parties need to work together and do not see a mutual 
benefit, or agree on a vision, then conflict can arise. The implementation of higher skills 
policy entails co-operation between various actors, with Higher Education at Work stating 
that ‘We want to see universities working with RDAs, SSCs and local employers to develop 
the higher level skills that a particular business needs in a particular sector in a particular 
place’ (DIUS 2008, 7). Co-production of policy outputs, in the shape of institutional-
employer partnerships for the development and delivery of higher skills provision, was 
therefore presented as fundamental to the essence of the policy. Although ‘incompatibility of 
objectives’ may not arise at the political or macro level, as the political parties appear to be 
largely in agreement with major business organisations and the union movement (Coffield 
2004; Lloyd and Payne 2006; TUC 2010), this may occur at the meso and micro level, 
particularly between higher education institutions and employer representative bodies, in 
terms of the form of policy outputs, and the costs and detail of implementation.  
A potential ‘zero-sum element’ can be perceived when implementation involves tension 
around a ‘preservation or change in the status quo’ (Dahrendorf 1958, 178). Status and 
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influence may be at risk if actors cannot find appropriate mechanisms to pursue their agendas 
in a changing landscape. For some agencies, profile and influence is dependent on the 
ongoing dominance of the skills discourse and reform of the processes of ‘skills supply’. 
Leitch (2006, 78-79) recommended that the Sector Skills Councils, responsible for 
representing employers’ skills demands, exercise greater influence over educational 
provision, but this may entail a loss of influence for professional bodies, educational 
institutions and training providers.  A zero sum element requires a policy strategy to mitigate 
potential conflict. In this case capacity building funding of approximately £103m was 
provided by HEFCE to higher education institutions to ease the implementation of the policy 
(Kewin et al. 2011, 4). This can be understood as a ‘remunerative mechanism’ (Etzioni 1961 
cited in Matland 1995), a form of compensation for participation in processes that require 
change and risk at an institutional level. In addition to reducing the cost of initiating and 
designing new programmes, the funding was intended to fuel a wider programme of change 
that would deliver a ‘culture shift’ (DIUS 2008, 4) towards greater employer responsiveness. 
Almost all higher education institutions engage employees in some form of workforce or 
professional development, often in close co-operation with employers. Partnerships have 
often proved problematic, due to different conceptions of what constitutes education and 
learning (Reeve and Gallagher, 2005). The occupations, professions and employers involved 
vary substantially in the level of prestige accorded to them by society, and thus prestigious 
institutions often have partnerships with prestigious employers and high status occupational 
groups (Gustavs and Clegg, 2005).  Moreover, these institutions may see workforce 
development activity as a lower priority in comparison with other initiatives and this may 
reflect in engagement in policy processes. On the other hand, institutions with less 
‘reputational capital’ (Naidoo and Jamieson 2005) may see potential opportunities, and 
threats, in the policy.  
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The inherent ambiguity of the policy 
Ambiguity is the second aspect of Matland’s model, with high levels of ambiguity combining 
with high conflict to produce ‘symbolic implementation’ and with low conflict to produce 
‘experimental implementation’ (Matland 1995, 165-170). In circumstances of low ambiguity 
administrative (low conflict) and political (high conflict) implementation are likely (Ibid., 
160-165). Matland stipulates that ambiguity can arise both in terms of means and goals (Ibid., 
157), which will have differing impact on the character of experimentalism and symbolism, 
and how these will emerge during implementation. 
The notion of ‘higher level skills’ is itself ambiguous, with the use of ‘skills’ to describe  
attributes that resemble aspects of personality, attitudes and class seen as desirable to 
employers (Payne 2000;  Ainley 1993; Lafer 2004), and forms of applied scientific and 
technical knowledge considered important for industry (DIUS 2008, 34; DBIS 2010, 4). 
Hyland and Johnson (1998) document the varieties of ways in which ‘skill-talk’ became 
increasingly prevalent in education policy discourse from the 1970s onwards, with the use of 
‘skills’ as a catch-all term for a range of learning experiences in formal education, training 
and the workplace. This ambiguity is combined with instrumentalism, as ‘skills’ appear  to be 
primarily defined in terms of what dominant parties consider to be useful for enhancing 
workplace effectiveness. Thus ‘skill-talk’ is often co-located with the rhetoric of human 
capital, the knowledge economy, and employer complaints about the perceived inadequacies 
of the education system. As Payne notes, the ambiguity inherent in the notion of ‘skill’ has 
‘great ideological virtue’ (2000, 362), symbolising vague notions of progress and high 
performance. The use of the adjective ‘higher’ can also add to the confusion. This tends to 
lead to discussion of specific levels on qualification frameworks, resulting in ‘higher skills’ 
being equated with accredited higher education in the policy discourse (i.e. Leitch 2006, 66-
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68), to the possible neglect of the development of higher level capabilities through non-
accredited informal and workplace learning. However it is these capabilities which appear to 
be the most in demand in the workplace to fuel the UK economy (UKCES 2010b). The 
underlying lack of clarity around the definition of ‘higher level skills’ leads to an inherent 
ambiguity of objectives, enabling the policy to be framed as the solution to wide range of 
economic and societal problems  (Stedward 2003; Payne 2000). 
Despite the intent of World Class Skills (DIUS 2007) and the overhaul to the relationship 
between employers and ‘providers’ recommended by Leitch (2006), the policy approach set 
out by government in 2008 suggested an ambiguity of means as much as goals. Higher 
Education at Work stated that the approach was ‘deliberately experimental in order to 
encourage the innovative capacity of higher education providers’ and explained that the role 
of HEFCE was to ‘test and invest in a range of approaches’ (DIUS 2008, 31). This approach 
was limited to three years with little indication of what might follow later, and measures of 
performance were in the process of development (DIUS 2008, 32). The key policy documents 
gave no explicit indication as to which of the over 100 higher education institutions in 
England should be involved, and whether some should be more involved than others.  Higher 
Education at Work therefore provided no clear answer to whether ‘workplace learning be 
treated in the same way as ‘widening participation’ (i.e. as an objective for all higher 
education) or….like research (i.e. with an emphasis on excellence and selectivity)?’ (Brennan 
and Little 2006, 6), a question asked in a report on workplace learning commissioned by 
HEFCE that preceded the development of the policy.  
In the same report Brennan and Little asked whether the involvement of higher education 
institutions in workplace learning was a ‘concern for a central higher education policy’ or 
‘best left to individual higher education providers and employers’ (2006, 6), a question that 
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was left unanswered, as despite the acceptance of Leitch’s recommendations for a coherent 
national strategy for skills, the extent of policy prescription for higher education remained 
ambiguous. Higher Education at Work suggested that the ‘innovative capacity’ of institutions 
was to be supported, and HEFCE introduced a ‘co-funding’ stream that encouraged employer 
contributions (DIUS 2008, 31), but it is difficult to marry this to the more directive 
stipulations of Leitch (2006) to ‘rebalance priorities’ and introduce demand-led funding 
(Leitch 2006, 68). This may reflect the contrasting approaches taken by government to 
different parts of the education infrastructure, with universities considered to have ‘seniority 
of status’ and further education colleges instructed to ‘do as they are told’ (Turner 2008). 
Fletcher (2008) draws attention to the differing tones of the annual grant letters provided to 
the funding councils responsible for further and higher education, and the ‘dialogue and 
debate’ that characterised the relationship between government and higher education at this 
time, the converse of the approach taken towards further education, at least in England 
(Hodgson and Spours 2011).  
To take the ambiguity and experimentalism of policy documents at face value should not of 
course neglect the potential for ambiguity to convey subtle and powerful messages. Higher 
Education at Work mentions recognition of ‘excellence in employer engagement’ in 
comparison with ‘more traditional business models’ (DIUS 2008, 26),  inviting engagement 
in this policy from those institutions that are not research intensive or aiming to grow 
numbers of ‘traditional’ full time undergraduates.  A discourse of ‘excellence’ is invoked to 
suggest the possibility of esteem for this area of work, even to the extent of parity with 
research intensive models. This may enable differentiation within the higher education sector 
(van Vught 2008) through an ambiguous notion ( in this case ‘excellence’) that can be 
defined and redefined to suit the institution, the sector and political imperatives (Delanty 
1998).   
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Experimentalism may also be entirely rational in this environment.  The proposed increase in 
higher skills provision required the consent and co-operation of a large number of 
organisations, many of whom the government can only influence indirectly and have 
significant resources that can be employed to resist policy. Moreover, no comparable policy 
had been attempted on this scale previously, with skills policy generally confined to further 
education. An experimental approach can thus be justified due to the uncertainty and novelty 
of the policy, with government testing the water and evaluating before formulating more 
detailed plans.  However, how the ‘experiment’ alluded to in Higher Education at Work 
(DIUS 2008) is intended to operate was not elaborated, with no detail on what might 
constitute success, and how the process was to be evaluated. This may suggest that the 
experiment was not constructed systematically, in the structured way that Pratt (2005) 
outlines, or that the experiment did not have any set objectives. Indeed, it is only in the 
evaluation report of the Transforming Workforce Development Programme (Kewin 2011:4) 
that a series of ‘first order’ and ‘additional objectives’ are set out in a coherent framework, 
although the ‘additional objectives’ are notable for their lack of specificity.  This ambiguous 
experimentalism may lead to what Matland terms ‘experimental implementation’, a situation 
in which ‘the contextual conditions dominate the process’ (Matland 1995, 165). 
 
The Select Committee inquiry into the implementation of the Leitch recommendations – 
a source of insight into the policy environment 
An inquiry examining the progress of the implementation of the Leitch recommendations, 
and therefore encompassing the higher skills policy, was undertaken by the Innovation 
Universities Science and Skills Select Committee in 2008-9 (IUSS 2008, 2009a). The select 
committee had invited submissions on how the Leitch recommendations would ‘affect the 
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broader structures of further education (FE), higher education (HE) and lifelong learning’ 
(IUSS 2009a, 7). In order to detect patterns of conflict in the policy environment the written 
responses to the inquiry were analysed thematically, using a deductive framework to organise 
analysis followed by a more inductive approach to coding patterns of conflict (Patton 2002). 
Therefore the first stage was to identify themes within the submissions that specifically 
related to higher education, including those that concerned the role of the Sector Skills 
Councils in higher education, delivery structures, relations between further and higher 
education, and the impact on students, all of which were mentioned in the terms of reference 
for the inquiry (IUSS 2009a, 7), and then to undertake an initial coding process based on 
these themes. This was followed by a development of a second tier of codes with which to 
categorise the positions taken by submitting agencies in respect of these themes. This enabled 
the identification of areas of consensus and conflict, and where there was direct criticism of 
either a particular policy or the actions of other agencies. Three substantive areas of 
contention emerged and these are discussed below.   
The inquiry received 63 submissions, including 13 from professional bodies and Sector Skills 
Councils, 5 from further and higher education institutions and 6 from other bodies involved 
with or representing further and higher education (including Universities UK, Association of 
Colleges, Million+ and the Humanities Subject Centres of the Higher Education Academy), 8 
from Government and public bodies involved with the organisation and funding of skills and 
higher education, and 31 from other interested parties, including individuals, and 
organisations  from the voluntary sector and industrial bodies representing employers (IUSS 
2008; IUSS 2009b).   
Million+, with members from the post-92 universities, was the only organisation advocating 
the interests of a sub-sectoral group of higher education institutions to submit evidence. There 
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were no submissions from either the Russell Group or the 1994 Group, who represent more 
research-orientated universities. This may indicate that the members of Million+ saw this 
area of policy as particularly relevant to their interests, whereas other institutions foresaw 
limited engagement. There were three submissions from institutions that became universities 
before 1992; from the Open University and Birkbeck College, London, who have  high 
numbers of part time students in employment (Feinstein et al. 2007), and the University of 
Sheffield. 
 The role of industrial or employer representative bodies in approving qualifications  
The Leitch Review recommended that higher education institutions ‘make available relevant, 
flexible and responsive provision that meets the high skills needs of employers and their 
staff’ (Leitch 2006, 68). This envisaged a role for Sector Skills Councils in approving all 
vocational qualifications up to Level 5 (then equivalent to postgraduate) including 
Foundation Degrees (Ibid., 79), and in approving ‘higher level provision offered by 
employers’ (p.83). Leitch also recommended that some public funding for higher education 
be delivered through a ‘demand-led mechanism’ (Ibid., 101), meaning the creation of greater 
incentives for higher education institutions to respond to the perceived or actual demand of 
employers for provision for their employees. Leitch asserted that this would mean that 
‘employers and SSCs have to develop direct relationships with universities’ (Ibid., 81).  
However, engagement between SSCs and higher education institutions is made problematic 
by a series of related factors. Attempts to embed the role of employer representative bodies in 
the U.K. have been hampered by the lack of the legal and social partnership frameworks 
present in other northern European countries that stipulate roles and responsibilities for all 
stakeholders in vocational education and training systems and engender a shared ownership 
of learning processes and outcomes (Sung 2010; Brockmann et al. 2008, 561). These 
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systemic factors are arguably at the root of confusion about the role of employer 
representative bodies in England,   and complaints about inefficiency, and unresponsiveness 
from employers and education providers (Payne 2008).  SSCs were originally constituted to 
replace the network of National Training Organisations which were ‘not seen to sufficiently 
understand employer needs’ (DfES 2001, 7), and thus, as part of their objectives, each SSC 
was to ‘build unrivalled intelligence’, and become ‘run and owned by employers’ while 
drawing on the expertise of ‘other stakeholders in the sector’ (DfES 2001, 9). Recent policy 
changes have re-emphasised the role of SSCs in employer engagement ‘to encourage 
collective employer ownership and investment’ in the skills needs of their sector (UKCES 
2012, 5).  However, many SSCs have struggled to define and deliver on the ‘employer 
engagement’ element of their role, with most proving unable to secure sustainable levels of 
funding and involvement from employers in their sectors (Payne 2008, Sung 2010). . 
Furthermore, SSCs and their predecessors have been primarily involved with further 
education and training provision, and thus have worked primarily with the qualification 
frameworks and curriculum processes of that sector rather than higher education, and 
distinctions persist between the two (Young 2006; Parry 2009).This indicates that SSCs may 
require substantial additional capacity to engage with higher education institutions which 
operate within a separate quality assurance regime and retain autonomy over programme 
design and curriculum development.  Sung’s (2010) discussion of the situation in the 
Netherlands  suggests that the status and capacity issues facing SSCs will not abate without a 
broader restructuring of the vocational education and training system, and with the councils 
having control over funding streams and qualification design. However, such reforms, if 
implemented, could drive the culture and rationale of SSCs even further from higher 
education, without a concomitant reform that would integrate some higher education 
institutions into the vocational education and training (VET) system in a similar fashion to 
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the arrangements in Germany, Scandinavia, or the Netherlands (Kyvik 2004; Sung et al. 
2006). 
It is clear from the written submissions of the universities of Sheffield, Hertfordshire, Central 
Lancashire and Million+ that higher education institutions had substantial reservations about 
the possible role of the Sector Skills Councils in relation to qualification validity and quality 
assurance (Hordern 2013), and their capacity to engage with the development of higher 
education programmes. Million+ were concerned about prospects to link funding specifically 
to qualifications validated by sector skills councils, and suggested this would result in greater 
complexity (IUSS 2008, 191). The University of Central Lancashire observed that ‘Sector 
Skills Councils …need more HEI representation and focus on higher level skills’ (Ibid., 140) 
and the University of Sheffield that ‘The Sector Skills Councils have had very little 
engagement with the HE providers, their main activity having related to pre-Level 4 awards’ 
(Ibid., 30). The suggestion is that the councils have limited understanding of the specificities 
and culture of higher education.   
In return, Sector Skills Councils levelled their criticisms at higher education institutions and 
prevailing higher education culture and processes that can serve to exclude external input, 
often portraying higher education as divorced from the perceived imperatives of the 
economy. Energy and Utility Skills allege that ‘many universities are stuck in academic-
learning process paradigms’ (IUSS 2008, 90), while the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils 
assert ‘there is room for improvement’ in partnering with employers (Ibid., 288). For 
Construction Skills, higher education is not necessarily seen as distinct from other ‘skills 
suppliers’, and SSCs should be empowered to take a ‘joined-up approach to FE, HE and 
lifelong learning’ (Ibid.,  268). Skillset provide a list of ‘barriers’ that are preventing greater 
engagement from ‘the supply side’, which include the lack of ‘bite-size learning’ to meet 
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employers’ needs (Ibid., 242), while SEMTA are hopeful that a ‘permanent change is taking 
place in terms of the availability of funding for more employer-led and employer-responsive 
provision’ (Ibid., 162).  
The Alliance of Sector Skills Councils observes that ‘government is increasing the amount of 
funding which is demand-led’ and ‘calls for it to be accelerated’ accompanied by the 
‘industry endorsement of courses’ (IUSS 2008, 288-9). This is echoed by Energy and Utility 
Skills who advocate greater sharing of HEFCE funding for programmes ‘between an HEI and 
an employer’ with workplace learning ‘recognised in the funding models’ (IUSS 2008:90). 
These changes would lead to funding for programmes flowing directly to employers and 
sector skills councils, and the ‘kitemarking’ of ‘approved’ provision. For higher education 
institutions this could be perceived as a considerable threat to autonomy, tying institutions 
into structures and relationships which for many might have echoes of the past (Hordern 
2012, 2013). For the former polytechnics, memories of the governance structures and 
perceived interference of local government in the 1960s and 70s have influenced institutional 
culture to the extent that autonomy is jealously guarded (Pratt 1997, 282-91; Burgess and 
Pratt 1970, 140-1). Such institutions have often worked in partnership with employers or 
employer representative bodies, but in recent time have done so on their own terms. The 
‘academic drift’ referred to by Pratt and Burgess (1974) and Pratt (1997) prizes a modus 
operandi that resists the influence of arbiters of knowledge validity that sit outside the 
academy. Whatever the reservations, however, it is noticeable that some institutions formed 
seemingly successful partnerships with sector skills councils between 2008-10 (Kewin et al. 
2011; IUSS 2008, 89), although in some cases this process may have been ‘smoothed’ by 
capacity building funding.  
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An added dimension of this evident difference of opinion about roles and responsibilities is 
the interface between the Sector Skills Councils and the professional bodies, which, although 
relevant only to certain occupations, have traditionally had a key role in ascribing value to 
qualifications (Lester 2009). The potential for tension is brought out in the submission of the 
Institute of Chemical Engineers, who warn that ‘Any lack of co-ordination, or any apparent 
competition’, between the professional engineering qualifications and the operations of the 
Sector Skills Councils ‘would be to the great detriment both of skills supply and of the 
engineering-based industries’ (IUSS 2008, 78). The Association of Accounting Technicians 
also believes that ‘the design of the Sector Skills Network’ is hindering Sector Skills 
Councils in their employer representative role, ‘and thus negates their ability to be the sole 
arbiters of ‘demand’ for qualifications.’  (Ibid., 81), suggesting a potential friction with 
professional bodies with established roles. It is also clear that many employers are unhappy 
with the Sector Skills Councils, with the Federation of Small Businesses expressing concern 
‘over many SSCs who lack small business representation’ (Ibid., 295) and the Association of 
British Pharmaceutical Industries identifying ‘confusion amongst employers and education 
providers on the most appropriate SSC to engage with’ because of a ‘lack of clear 
differentiation of responsibility for scientific and technical subjects’ between Sector Skills 
Councils (Ibid.,  38).  
The mechanisms of implementation 
Many of the educational institutions and their representatives point to the difficulties of 
employer engagement and the time and resources required to develop appropriate higher 
skills provision.  The University of Central Lancashire requests ‘greater recognition of the 
upfront costs and challenges in this area’ (Ibid., 140), while Million+ emphasises the 
‘’hidden’ institutional costs associated with work-based learning’  and details the wide range 
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of programme design, support and quality assurance activities needed when working with 
employers (Ibid., 190). Universities UK identifies the risk involved for institutions if 
programmes fail to recruit students, making a distinction between employer and student 
demand (Ibid., 256). The University of Hertfordshire and Oaklands College highlight the 
problematics of ‘demand-led’ intervention in programme content, as it ‘may take years before 
the effects of changing curricula are translated into skilled individuals in the workplace, by 
which time the critical competencies for the area may well be different’ (Ibid., 130).  
Two submissions draw attention to the possibility that much of funding provided to higher 
education institutions may not result in greater volumes or increased quality of higher skills 
provision.  Energy and Utility Skills state that ‘Too many HEIs have been successful in 
procuring funding from HEFCE for workforce development projects without any evidence of 
explicit employer engagement’ (IUSS 2008,  90) and the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industries emphasise the scale of the funding that is targeted at  
‘infrastructure for employer engagement and co-funded provision’, noting with caution that 
‘It is too early to see if this funding will have any impact on engagement with pharmaceutical 
employers’ (Ibid., 38). This scepticism about the outcomes of the initiative may be well 
founded considering the caveats outlined in previous research into employer-university 
partnerships (Reeve and Gallacher 2005). However, for the Engineering Employers 
Federation it is the slow pace of implementation that is a cause for concern, while ‘our 
competitors have continued to move forward.’ (IUSS 2008, 55).  
There may also have been an undercurrent of resentment from further education colleges and 
training providers in respect of the funding provided by HEFCE to higher education 
institutions. City and Guilds argue that the capacity building funding ‘should also be 
extended to the FE sector, while still allowing them the flexibility to make their own 
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decisions on co-operation arrangements’ (IUSS 2008, 97). The potential for conflict between 
higher education institutions and ambitious further education colleges, who have made claims 
that they can deliver higher education more efficiently (Association of Colleges 2011) and 
with greater student satisfaction than higher education institutions (IUSS 2008, 253), is 
demonstrated in Million+’s assertion that the relationship between further and higher 
education ‘should be one of collaboration, not competition’ (Ibid., 192). Million+ also 
emphasise that ‘There is a common misconception about FE capacity to deliver higher level 
learning with only 5.5% of HE currently delivered in FE. Higher level learning is done most 
effectively when done in partnership with the expertise of an HEI’ (Ibid., 192). There is a 
different perspective, too, on the role of the Sector Skills Councils in developing and quality 
assuring qualifications. The 157 group of larger further education colleges declare that ‘the 
SSCs need to press ahead with their flexible and relevant qualification frameworks with a 
significant number of employers and providers becoming awarding bodies’ (Ibid., 59). 
The skills for growth model and the interests of students 
There are criticisms of the assumptions made by Leitch and government regarding the role of 
higher education in skills ‘supply’. These reflect the tensions of embedding a ‘skills for 
growth’ model in England, to the exclusion of other models of lifelong learning (Coffield 
2000). For the Humanities Subject Centres of the Higher Education Academy, Leitch’s 
proposals ‘need to be interpreted in a larger and more encompassing educational and cultural 
environment’ (IUSS 2008 p.138), advancing the centrality of ‘higher level critical thinking’. 
The Open University highlight the importance of the portability of skills in the changing 
economy, rejecting any emphasis on ‘narrow specific job related skills’ (Ibid., 165) and 
expressing concern in respect of the ‘prevailing and implicit view’ that institutions must 
prioritise employer rather than learner demand (Ibid., 163). These assertions resonate with 
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those made by Universities UK in respect of individual self-development and employer 
involvement in negotiating the value of educational knowledge. Using a quote from Leitch 
that emphasises that ‘the best form of welfare is to ensure that people can adapt to change’ 
(Leitch 2006, 7), Universities UK make reference to the paradoxes of excluding the subtler 
and less quantifiable benefits of education from policy considerations, asserting that the 
‘interests of students and employers overlap but they do not necessarily coincide’ (IUSS 
2008, 256).  
The seeming incongruence of the policy changes around equivalent level qualifications 
(ELQ) with the higher skills objectives of Leitch is mentioned in the submissions of the 
University of Sheffield (IUSS 2008 p. 30), the Humanities Subject Centres of the HEA (p. 
139), Million+ (Ibid.,192), Birkbeck College, University of London (Ibid.,.215), and SKILL: 
The National Bureau for Students with Disabilities (Ibid.,75). The focus is on ensuring that 
pathways back to higher level learning remain open to individuals on their own terms rather 
than through their employers and associated co-funding mechanisms. There are questions 
around equity emerging here, as the impact of the removal of funding for equivalent level 
qualifications may also be to reduce choice and opportunity for those without higher 
education qualifications who are directed onto higher skills programmes via their employers 
(Hordern 2011).  If those students subsequently decide they would like to study for a degree 
unrelated to their current employment they may find themselves ineligible for any kind of 
available HEFCE subsidy for that provision if they are already qualified to level 6 on the 
Qualifications and Credit Framework. Such arguments may maintain their salience in the 
context of reforms enacted by the Conservative led coalition government as it is highly 
probable that students will only be allowed to access financial support for their first degree 
(DBIS 2011). One possible mitigating factor, however, is the pledged introduction of access 
to student loans for part time undergraduates (Kewin et al. 2011; DBIS 2011). 
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Concerns are also expressed regarding the progress of individual learners in the context of 
increasing employer influence.  Million+ warn that the standards of qualifications may be 
compromised if SSCs are able to accredit modules directly in response to employer demand, 
and this may reduce transferability ‘to the detriment of the individual learner’s future 
prospects of progression’(IUSS 2008, 191). The salience of this point may vary depending on 
the Sector Skills Council involved. The limited levels of influence of many SSCs in their 
respective sectors (Payne 2008b) could lead to powerful employers ‘railroading’ 
qualifications through that are specific to their needs rather than the wider sectoral interests or 
those of the student. 
The scope of conflict 
There appears to be a plausible argument that ‘an interdependence of actors, an 
incompatibility of objectives, and a perceived zero-sum element to the interactions’ (Matland 
1995, 13) exists. The extent of this conflict can be tempered by the reworking of policy to 
suit key parties, and the degree to which the policy encroaches on the operational activities of 
higher education institutions and their relationships with employers. However, this can also 
result in new forms of conflict, seemingly unrelated to the original policy. 
Higher skills policy required some engagement between higher education institutions and 
employers as a minimum, but levels of ‘interdependence’ can be graduated, particularly if 
accurate real time data around skills demands provided by employers and their representative 
bodies is made available to institutions as market intelligence to develop and deliver 
programmes.  This might not require significant partnership working, but it would require a 
form of interdependence as institutions would rely on this intelligence to give credence to the 
higher level programmes developed. An important question here is whether the sectorally 
based intelligence correctly reflects industrial demand, or if, in fact, it is only through 
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relationships between individual employers and institutions that a full understanding of 
whether institutions can meet employer demand emerges. As the Universities UK and 
Million+ submissions to the ‘After Leitch’ inquiry emphasise, employers need to share risks 
and costs with institutions if this form of higher skills development and delivery, based on 
individual relationships, is to thrive (IUSS 2008, 190, 256). The notion of ‘interdependence’ 
also concerns employees, whose voices are marginal in the skills debate. Universities UK and 
Million+ both identify the potential tension between the needs of the employer and the 
employee/student, with Million+ highlighting the need for ‘a strong individual route back 
into higher level learning, not one based around or reliant on employer funding and ‘co-
operation’ (Ibid.,193). Conflict can easily arise if employees feel that the provision offered to 
them is not beneficial for their interests, development or future career.  
The ‘incompatability’ of objectives would only become fully apparent if higher skills policy 
reached into the mainstream of higher education activity and impacted on those who clearly 
do not share the Leitchean and governmental view of skills. Similarly, the ‘zero-sum’ 
interaction would arise only when partners are compelled to interact on projects where they 
perceive there to be possible disbenefits. Brennan and Little (2006)  asked whether increasing 
workplace learning through employer engagement is an objective for the whole higher 
education sector or a specific group of institutions, and whether such initiatives  would be 
best left to develop ‘organically’ between higher education institutions and employers. The 
evidence suggests that the majority of capacity building funding was acquired by a specific 
higher education sub-sector, primarily but not exclusively the post-92 institutions and some 
former Colleges of Advanced Technology (Kewin et al. 2011). These institutions may have 
seen the benefits of accessing this funding in the context of increasing risks to their other 
income sources, whether they be international students, loss of research funding or 
demographic decline affecting undergraduate intakes. The absence of substantial numbers of 
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Russell Group or 1994 Group institutions amongst those funded may indicate that there was 
limited competition as part of the call for bids, and that these institutions wished to prioritise 
other areas of activity (Hordern 2012). The use of capacity building funding (DIUS 2008) can 
partially circumvent any sense amongst partners that there may be risk of any ‘zero-sum’ 
interaction, notwithstanding concerns about the sustainability of employer-institutional 
relationships (Kewin et al. 2011). 
 One area in which there seems to be considerable agreement is the baffling complexity of the 
‘dogs breakfast’ of the skills system (Lord 2008), at least amongst those agencies with some 
knowledge of its mechanisms and processes. Complexity and confusion is identified by AAT 
(IUSS 2008, 79), EEF (Ibid., 55), SEMTA (Ibid., 159), EU Skills (Ibid., 85), Construction 
Skills (Ibid., 266), the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils (Ibid., 281), and the Centre for 
Enterprise (Ibid., 201). Regional agencies and partnerships are sources of particular problems 
for EU Skills (Ibid., 85) and the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils (Ibid., 281), as discussed 
in (Hordern 2013).  
Ambiguity and policy ‘appropriacy’ 
Elements of the ambiguity that permeates government policy documents can also be 
identified in some of the submissions to the select committee inquiry discussed above. 
Various interested parties appear to perceive government policy to be more prescriptive and 
directive than is evident from the analysis of World Class Skills and Higher Education and 
Work detailed earlier in this paper. For example, City and Guilds interpret recent policy as 
representing a ‘government announcement of plans to embed the role of businesses in the 
funding and direction of HE’ (IUSS 2008, 97), while the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils 
perceive that the government is ‘developing HE’s business responsiveness by increasing the 
amount of funding that is demand-led’ (Ibid., 288). These perceptions, although partially 
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accurate, tend to exaggerate the strength of policy commitment and are belied by the notions 
of ‘shared responsibility’ (Ibid., 112) foregrounded by HEFCE, the strategy of building 
capacity at an institutional level and the encouragement of ‘successful partnerships’ (DIUS 
2008, 24) between employers and higher education rather than a unilateral focus on 
enhancing the influence of employers.  
More generally, the Open University observe a ‘lack of clarity’ both in terms of the role of 
institutional collaboration and in how ‘skills’ are interpreted (IUSS 2008, 164-5), and EEF 
(the Engineering Employers) imply that there is something of a gap between Leitch and 
government policy, with the ‘time to translate’ recommendations into implementation 
opening up opportunities for implementation confusion (Ibid., 54-56). Similarly the Council 
for Industry and Higher Education (CIHE) draw attention to the difficulties of interpreting 
policy by stating that the government’s ‘preferred approach’ in respect of developing 
relationships between employers and higher education ‘appears’ (Ibid., 136) to be an 
extension of  brokerage  independent of higher education institutions, a strategy that CIHE 
warn against (Ibid., 137). Notwithstanding the use of brokerage and ‘intermediaries’ in three 
higher level skills pathfinders that aimed to ‘develop new forms of higher education 
provision in response to employer demand’ (Ibid., 111), it is also evident that the 
government’s preferred approach could also have been interpreted as the building of 
employer engagement capacity at an institutional level.  
The ambiguity of the policy can be perceived as part of the process of making the policy 
‘appropriate’ to the norms of the higher education sector in the U.K., which retains aspects of 
horizontal differentiation based on differing institutional missions in tandem with a stronger 
vertical differentiation based primarily on reputation (Brennan and Osborne 2008; Teichler 
2007). Policies that potentially exacerbate differentiation in ways that might be construed as 
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re-imagining the missions of a group of institutions need therefore to be couched in 
reasonably ambiguous terms. This is not necessarily a process of consciously deciding to treat 
certain institutions in particular ways, although that may be a factor. Instead the ambiguity 
and experimentalism of the policy can be perhaps better understood through the need for 
government not to be seen to be attempting to advance differentiation without the consent of 
the institutions involved. In this sense government is attempting to steer the policy 
environment ‘at a distance’ (Neave 1998), conscious of the prevalence of an ideology of 
‘institutional autonomy’, and the strength of the higher education field to determine its own 
character (Maton 2005). 
 A ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 2004) structures the actions that are 
considered legitimate within higher education and contributes to the strength of the field. In 
the case of academic environments this is imbued with powerful notions of disinterestedness, 
objectivity and freedom that are derived from the socio-historical context of higher education 
(Delanty 2001; Marginson 2008). Notwithstanding the challenges to its claims to professional 
privilege (Beck and Young 2005), academic identity retains considerable strength (Henkel 
2005) and social esteem, according higher status to staff in higher education than those 
working in other educational environments. This suggests politicians may need to work 
harder to secure successful implementation in a policy environment that has in-built socio-
cultural resources of resistance, and ambiguity may provide a useful tool for building 
consensus. Indeed, Matland (1995, 158, 165) recognises how ambiguity can enable the 
coalescence of differing perspectives, albeit while also allowing ‘contextual conditions’ to 
influence implementation processes.  
These more sociological explanations for policy ambiguity should not entirely outweigh the 
practical realities, however. Higher education institutions in the U.K. are autonomous 
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organisations with multiple revenue streams. Irrespective of ongoing dependence on 
government funding for teaching and research, institutional leaders are able to consider a 
range of alternative strategies to achieve financial viability, and this may include ignoring 
some government policies (Hordern 2012). In this context of these explanations ambiguous 
policy may prove the only effective way of initiating change, in order to avoid outright 
resistance or complete disregard for the initiative.   
Concluding remarks: the unfinished experiment 
Returning to Matland’s (1995) ambiguity-conflict model it is reasonable to suggest that the 
implementation of higher skills policy could perceptibly fit into two categories, both those of 
‘symbolic implementation’, which arises with high ambiguity and high conflict, and 
‘experimental implementation’, which occurs in situations of high ambiguity and low 
conflict. Conflict was clearly present within the higher skills policy environment, but was 
confined to certain aspects of implementation due to the limited ‘reach’ of the policy within 
the sector. Higher skills activity remained a peripheral aspect of higher education in England, 
involving certain kinds of institutions in certain ways, and therefore the opportunity for 
conflict was marginal as critical parties were relatively unaffected by the policy. On the other 
hand, if the government had intended to route increasing volumes of funding via this 
approach, following Leitch’s recommendations, and to affect a wider range of institutions in 
doing so, then the opportunities for conflict would have increased considerably. The 
government was clearly conscious of the potential for resistance from higher education 
institutions, and used a remunerative ‘capacity building’ mechanism, in the shape of funding 
for the workforce development projects, to ensure a smoother pattern of implementation. This 
can be seen as part of making the initiative ‘experimental’ to further guard against 
unnecessary conflict and any suggestion that government is trying to re-orientate the missions 
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of higher education institutions without institutional input. Here government is conscious of 
the power of the field of higher education to absorb and rework policy to the advantage of 
institutions.  
The ‘experiment’ of higher skills policy was scheduled to run for three years from 2008 
(DIUS 2008, 31). However this straddled the election of a different government in 2010 
which developed radical policies towards higher education, if not to skills (DBIS 2010, 
2011). As a result of this change in ‘conditions’, the experiment ceased to have its original 
purpose and the ‘testing’ alluded to in Higher Education at Work (DIUS 2008, 31) could not 
be effectively completed. The evaluation of the HEFCE funded workforce development 
programme illustrated how employer engagement had grown at some institutions and resulted 
in enrolments that exceeded the stated target (Kewin et al. 2011, 5-9). This enabled the 
evaluation to claim that programme investment had been ‘successful in providing a platform 
of capability and capacity’ (2011, 10) for this form of higher education, albeit against suitably 
ambiguous objectives (2011, 4) that did not appear in a coherent form in the earlier policy 
documents. Current plans for higher education place almost all of this provision outside the 
scope of public funding (DBIS 2011), and therefore no further ‘incentives’ will be 
forthcoming, at least for the foreseeable future. Thus the future of this form of higher 
education remains uncertain, but is likely to involve institutions and employers coming 
together on their own terms, outside of the other policy experiments currently absorbing 
English higher education.   
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